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Abstract: 
In this study we explore in detail the causes of corruption in China using two 
different sets of data at the regional level (provinces and cities). We observe 
that regions with more anti-corruption efforts, histories of British rule, higher 
openness, more access to media and relatively higher wages of government 
employees are markedly less corrupt; while social heterogeneity, regulation, 
abundance of resource and state-owned enterprises substantially breed 
regional corruption. Moreover, fiscal decentralization is discovered to depress 
corruption significantly, while administrative decentralization fosters local 
corruption. We also find that there is currently a positive relationship between 
corruption and economic development in China that is mainly driven by the 
transition to a market economy.  
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Corruption has caused vexation to the nation’s leadership since the People’s Republic of 
China was established in 1949. For example, two senior officials, Qingshan Liu and Zishan 
Zhang, were executed in 1952 due to corruption. Chinese leadership has tried to control 
corruption mainly by mass movements before 1978. Since economic reform was launched in 
1978, corruption has become more and more widespread in China. Lui (1983) reports that 
corruption exists at every level of the political system in China. It has, for example, been 
reported that in 1989 the market price of coal was 674 percent of the subsidized price in 
China. Similarly, other producer goods were substantially higher than prices fixed by the 
state. As a consequence, payoffs to get supplies at state prices were very common (Rose-
Ackerman, 1999). Industrial and commercial enterprises in China require government 
authorization to operate which promotes corruption in the area of enterprise licensing through 
bribery done by applicants to obtain the licenses (Manion, 1996).  Lui (1983, p. 603) 
differentiates between three types of corruption: “the first group comprises corrupt acts such 
as embezzlement and bribes, which are common place among nations having a political 
system to speak of; the second group, such as appropriation of public goods, illegal trade, and 
housing irregularity, results from a breakdown in the central allocation system and is 
commonplace among socialist nations… But the third group of corrupt acts is rather 
peculiarly Chinese Communist, e.g., illegitimate feasting, feudal rites, false models, and 
illegal imprisonment and torture”. The Chinese government has admitted that corruption “is 
now worse than during any other period since New China was founded in 1949. It has spread 
into the Party, into Government administration and into every part of society, including 
politics, economy, ideology and culture” (Guoqing Liang, 1994, p. 122). Two members of the 
Politburo, Xitong Chen and Liangyu Chen, have been successively accused of taking huge 
bribes in recent years. This provides anecdotal evidence of the increasing seriousness of 
corruption in China. Some Chinese observers have even remarked that there are no Chinese 
officials beyond corruption. 
      Rampant corruption is a distinct feature of current China, the biggest transitional and 
developing country. Many papers have emerged about corruption in China, most of which are 
written by sociologists and political scientists (for example, White, 1996; Wedeman, 2004; 
and Gong, 2006). As to economic studies, Yao (2002) argued that corruption in China is 
generated by the Chinese political system, which grants and protects privileges. Cai, Fang 
and Xu (2009) investigated the institutional causes of corruption among Chinese firms with a 3 
 
firm-level data set. Still, there is a lack of more comprehensive economic analysis with an 
empirical focus about the causes of corruption in China. 
      There are numerous studies on the causes of corruption. Most of these are cross-national 
studies using subjective survey data. For instance, Treisman (2000) carried out a 
comprehensive cross-country study investigating the causes of corruption with several 
indexes of perceived corruption. This kind of study, although fruitful, cannot circumvent two 
problems. Firstly, subjective survey data experience some biases. Treisman (2007) pointed 
out that corruption perception data actually reflect impressions of intensity of corruption 
instead of the corruption phenomenon itself. The data consequently are correlated to the 
beliefs of the survey respondents and to many other social and economic conditions and 
hence could be biased (see also Knack, 2006). According to Bertrand and Mullainathan 
(2001), subjective data cannot be convincingly used as explained variables since their 
measurement error is associated with many other background characteristics affected by 
explanatory variables. Secondly, it is hard for cross-country analysis to solve omitted variable 
bias. Substantial unobservable or unmeasurable differences in institutions and cultures 
between countries make cross-country results problematic. Some researchers attempted to 
bypass the bias with fixed effect regressions in cross-country studies. However, according to 
Treisman (2007) and Knack (2006), the appropriateness of using the subjective corruption 
indices in the longitudinal analysis is rather questionable.    
      Disadvantages  in  cross-national  research can certainly be mitigated when we use a 
within-country objective data set. Firstly, using objective within-country data can of course 
avoid biases from subjective data. Secondly, there is a higher level of homogeneity within a 
country though some differences still exist at a regional level. The omitted variable bias 
troubling cross-country analysis hence can be moderated in within-country studies. In this 
respect, studies of China have a unique advantage. On the one hand, China is a centralized 
country with unified legal and administrative systems. Furthermore the Chinese society is 
fairly homogenous due to the fact that the Han nationality with Confucian values is in the 
absolute majority in most regions. The high degree of legal and social homogeneity within 
China hence will help us to efficiently mitigate the omitted variable bias in an empirical 
analysis. On the other hand, as shown in Table 1, there are great economic differences 
between the rich eastern and the poor western provinces in China. In 2008 the GDP (PPP) per 
capita of Shanghai, which approximates that of Hungary, was about nine times as high as the 
GDP (PPP) per capita of Guizhou province, which is at the same level of that of Cameroon. 
Thus, a study of China is extremely helpful to understand the causes of corruption in 4 
 
developing and transitional economies where corruption is one of the central issues. We 
therefore moderate the limitation of within-country analysis in line with Glaeser and Saks 
(2006) who analysed corruption within the US using statistics of federal corruption 
convictions. Surprisingly, there are hardly any papers on the causes of corruption using 
within-country data and most of them are working with US data. Goel and Nelson (1998) 
investigate the effect of government size on corruption with the American annual state-level 
data set. Fisman and Gatti (2002b) employ the information of the mismatch between the 
revenue generation and expenditure in the U.S. states to test the relationship between 
decentralization and corruption. Svensson (2003) use the firm-level data set from Uganda to 
explore the determinants of firm bribery payments. Cai, Fang and Xu (2009), as mentioned 
above, also employ the firm-level data to examine the “micro” causes of corruption in China.  
 
                  Table 1    
                  GDP (PPP) per capita of Chinese regions in 2008 (Intl. $) 
  Beijing  16577    Anhui  3810  Chongqing  4741 
  Tianjin  14590    Fujian  7922    Sichuan  4044 
  Hebei  6112    Jiangxi  3887    Guizhou  2321 
  Shanxi  5365    Shandong  8701    Yunnan  3310 
  Inner Mongolia  8472    Henan  5153    Tibet  3646 
  Liaoning  8221    Hubei  5223    Shaanxi  4799 
  Jilin  6184    Hunan  4608    Gansu  3185 
    Heilongjiang  5714 Guangdong  9886     Qinghai  4573 
  Shanghai  19232    Guangxi  3936    Ningxia  4706 
  Jiangsu  10421    Hainan  4517    Xinjiang  5232 
  Zhejiang  11102         
 
In this paper we adopt a similar approach to Glaeser and Saks (2006) to investigate the causes 
of corruption in China with regional data sets. Besides confirming most cross-country 
findings in a more controlled setting, our study adds to literature in several ways. Firstly, we 
observe a positive relationship between corruption and economic development in China due 
to the transition process in China. Secondly, we obtain the novel within-country evidence 
about the effects of the history of British rule and the abundance of the natural resource on 
corruption. Thirdly, we find that even in a nondemocratic country the access to partly 
controlled media still controls corruption.  
      The organization of our paper is as follows. Section II reviews previous research about 
causes of corruption. Section III empirically determines the causes of corruption in China 
focusing on a large set of factors. In Section IV we provide some concluding remarks. 5 
 
II. DETERMINANTS OF CORRUPTION 
We first review the possible causes of corruption implied in previous research. Since political 
institutions, the judicial system and cultural environment are homogenous among Chinese 
regions, we will focus here on other determinants of corruption. According to Jain (2001), 
there are three prerequisites necessary for incidences of corruption. First, that bureaucrats 
have discretionary power. Second, that this power is associated with economic rents. Finally, 
that the deterrence to corruption, as a function of the probability of being caught and penalty 
for corrupt act, is adequately low. The first two preconditions determine the benefit of 
corruption, while the last precondition influences the cost of corruption. Therefore the 
regional characteristics that affect these preconditions, according to Becker (1968), will 
determine the local incidence of corruption. 
       The bureaucrat’s discretion over the allocation of resources is important to the existence 
of corruption. According to Rose-Ackerman (1978), discretionary power is mainly related to 
regulations. Bureaucrats can always obtain discretion to distribute resources when setting and 
implementing regulations. More regulations will bring in more discretionary power and 
therefore will also promote incidences of corruption. In contrast, levels of corruption are 
expected to decrease if controlled economies become more marketized.  
     Increasing government size enhances the discretionary power of government by enlarging 
the social resource that it controls. LaPalombara (1994) used a sample of countries excluding 
Scandinavian countries to show that the size of the government budget relative to GDP is 
positively correlated with levels of corruption. La Porta et al. (1999) also found empirically a 
positive relationship between the government transfers and subsidies and corruption. 
However, using the index of state interference from the World Competitiveness Report, 
Treisman (2000) could not find any solid evidence that greater state intervention is related to 
higher corruption. 
      Decentralization can influence the discretionary power of government. There is a debate 
upon the relationship between decentralization and corruption. According to Brennan and 
Buchanan (1980) and Weingast (1995), decentralization introduces competition between 
local governments reducing therefore the profits that bureaucrats can get being corrupt. The 
mechanism of entry and exit in federal states provides a strong incentive to produce public 
services in accordance to individuals’ preferences (Hirschman, 1970). For example, exit 
threats of firms (higher mobility) can be a method of government control (Rose-Ackerman, 
1999). Moreover federalism and local autonomy is combined with innovation. Federalism 6 
 
serves as a laboratory for effective policy inventions (Oates, 1999). On the other hand, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) argue that since decentralization causes the dispersion of the 
government’s power, bureaucrats without coordination will over extract rents from firms. 
Smallness and intimacy of local jurisdictions with patronage-ridden governments can 
promote corrupt relationships (Rose-Ackerman 1999). Treisman (2000), using a dummy 
variable reflecting whether a state is federal, finds that federal states are perceived to be more 
corrupt. However, Fisman and Gatti (2002a) report cross-country evidence that fiscal 
decentralization in government expenditure is significantly correlated with lower corruption. 
Using American data, Fisman and Gatti (2002b) also find a positive relationship between the 
proportion of a state’s expenditure derived from federal transfers and corruption.  
      It  is  obvious  that  rational  individuals will pay bribes only if they can get a higher 
marginal benefit from it. Economic rents related to discretionary powers are the necessary 
condition of the incidence of corruption. Discretionary powers without related rents will 
hardly lead to corruption. Ades and Di Tella (1999) show that countries where firms have 
higher rents tend to be more corrupt. Natural resource exploitation is an activity of 
particularly high rents that are concentrated and easily expropriable (Sachs and Warner 
2001). Leite and Weidmann (1999) hence find in their empirical analysis that the incidence of 
corruption depends significantly on natural resource abundance. However, Treisman (2000) 
did not provide strong evidence that fuel and mineral exports are positively correlated with 
the level of corruption.  
Another source of economic rent is the lack of competition. Economic rents will decrease 
with intensive competition in economic activities. Ades and Di Tella (1996, 1999) employ a 
country’s openness to indicate the external competition firms face and find that the economic 
openness of a country, measured by the share of imports in GDP, is negatively correlated 
with the level of corruption in the country. Treisman (2000) also provided evidence that the 
share of imports in GDP is negatively associated with the corruption level. Recently, Gerring 
and Thacker (2005) find a similar relationship between trade openness and corruption.     
      The deterrence of corruption is a joint function of the possibility of being detected and 
punishment once caught. There are several factors affecting the probability of detection. 
Higher level of income accelerates the spread of education and democratic institutions and 
therefore enhances individuals’ political involvement. It consequently enables private 
individuals to better identify corrupt behaviour and to punish the malfeasance of officials . As 
a result, regions with richer and more educated citizens are assumed to be less corrupt. 
According to Treisman (2007), the negative relationship between the incidence of corruption 7 
 
and the income level is the strongest and most consistent finding of the empirical studies on 
corruption (see, e.g., La Porta et al., 1999; Ades and Di Tella, 1999 and Treisman, 2000). The 
probability of getting caught also depends on the effectiveness of the country’s legal system. 
La Porta et al. (1999) argued that the common law systems in Britain and its former colonies 
are more effective in protecting property rights and enforcement, than the civil law systems. 
Probabilities of corruption being exposed therefore are higher in common law countries. 
Treisman (2000) indeed showed that Britain and its former colonies have a significantly 
lower level of corruption than other countries, while Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2008) do not 
find such a linkage. 
      Social and economic heterogeneity may also be an indirect determinant of the probability 
of detection. You and Khagram (2005, p. 136) argued that “the poor are more vulnerable to 
extortion and less able to monitor and hold the rich and powerful accountable as income 
inequality increases”. It enables the latter to abuse their power for private gain. Income 
inequality therefore promotes higher levels of corruption. They then confirmed their 
argument with a cross-country analysis. However, Husted (1999) did not find any evidence of 
the relationship between income inequality and corruption. Ethnical fractionalization is also 
believed to promote corruption because the corrupt officials may be protected by their own 
ethnic groups due to political reason. Treisman (2000) and Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2007) 
failed to find strong evidence of this, while Glaester and Saks (2006) results support the fact 
that racial division is positively correlated with corruption levels in US states. 
      In addition, press freedom plays an important role in detecting corruption as independent 
journalists have incentives to investigate whether there is corruption. As a particular 
mechanism of external control, press freedom appears to reduce corruption. Firms and 
individuals can reveal the corrupt behaviour to a journalist and the possibility of a media 
report increases the costs for bureaucrats to be corrupt (The probability of being detected 
increases). In other words, the media can be seen as a platform for voicing complaints 
(Brunetti and Weder 2003). Adsera, Boix and Payne (2003, p. 455) point out that the “free 
circulation of daily newspaper” (the interaction term of a democratic measure and newspaper 
circulation) is negatively correlated with corruption. Brunetti and Weder (2003) find 
empirically that a high level of press freedom is associated with a low incidence of 
corruption, while Chowdhury (2004) emphasizes that press freedom controls corruption via 
the channel of democracy. Freille, Haque and Kneller (2007) performed a modified extreme 
bounds analysis to identify that the greater the press freedom the lower the level of 
corruption. 8 
 
      It is difficult to directly test the effect of punishment on corruption levels because it is 
difficult to compare punishment across different countries. However, higher wages imply 
higher opportunity costs when officials are ousted due to corruption. Van Rijkeghem and 
Weder (2001) find that in developing countries a higher ratio of civil service wages to 
manufacturing wages is significantly correlated to a lower level of corruption.  However 
Treisman (2000) cannot provide clear evidence that higher government wages depress 
corruption.  It is also interesting to note that in Ancient Egypt, the pharaohs searched for 
ways to reduce the corruption of their tax collectors (called scribes). The scribes were paid 
high salaries to reduce the incentives to enrich themselves by cheating taxpayers. 
Furthermore, scribes working in the field were controlled by a group of special scribes from 
the head office (see Adams, 1993). Rose-Ackerman (1999) stresses: “Pay increases may 
indeed be necessary for good performance, but only if the increases are tied to productivity 
and are accompanied by a reduction in the overall level of public sector employment” (p. 87).  
 
 
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
The administrative division of China listed are provincial region, prefectural region and 
county or district. In this paper we will use two different regional data sets to explore the 
causes of corruption in China. The first one is a province-level data set which consists of data 
from all 31 provincial areas during the period 1998 to 2007 in mainland of China: 22 
provinces, 5 autonomous regions and 4 municipalities. We do not include data from 
Hongkong, Macao and Taiwan in it because of the substantial differences in the political and 
legal systems between them and other parts of China. 
      Corruption measure in the first data set we use is derived from the China Procuratorial 
Yearbooks.  We collect the number of annual registered cases on corruption in the 
procurator’s office by region. We then divide these registered cases by regional population to 
get our corruption measure: regional registered cases on corruption per 100,000 people each 
year
a. The definition of corruption-related crimes in Chinese Criminal Law keeps evolving 
until the new Criminal Law was passed by the Fifth Session of the Eighth National People's 
Congress of China in 1997. The Chapter VIII: Crimes of Embezzlement and Bribery in the 
                                                            
a We also performed our provincial analysis with an alternative corruption measure: the provincial number of officials 
investigated in registered cases on corruption per 100,000 population. Since this corruption measure is only available in the 
period from 2003 to 2007, we do not report here the estimation results with it, but one should note that the results are quite 
similar.  9 
 
new Criminal Law includes all corruption-related crimes and basically remains unchanged 
since then. In order to ensure the comparability of the corruption data, we therefore choose 
the corruption data from 1998 to 2007 to investigate the causes of corruption in China. 
Average regional corruption data are listed in Table 2. Using conviction data has the strength 
of dealing with a less subjective measure of corruption offering also the opportunity to work 
with longer time spans. In addition, they are not subject to the problems of sampling error and 
survey non-response (Glaeser and Saks, 2006). On the other hand, there is the disadvantage 
that the conviction rate is driven by the quality of detection process. The weakness, however, 
will not trouble us in our current study since the quality of local judicial systems in China is 
basically homogeneous and we will control local anti-corruption efforts in regressions as 
well.   
 
Table 2    












per 100,000 Pop. 
Tianjin   5.01  Shaanxi   3.15  Yunnan   2.61 
Heilongjiang   4.77  Qinghai   3.08  Hunan   2.59 
Jilin   4.5  Ningxia  3.08  Hainan   2.59 
Liaoning   4.12  Hubei   3.05  Beijing   2.59 
Shanxi   3.83  Guizhou   2.95  Chongqing   2.49 
Hebei   3.67  Zhejiang   2.9  Anhui   2.36 
Shandong   3.61  Inner Mongolia  2.77  Sichuan   2.35 
Xinjiang  3.41  Shanghai   2.77  Gansu   2.05 
Fujian   3.4  Jiangsu   2.71  Guangdong   2.05 
Henan   3.35  Guangxi  2.64  Tibet   1.77 
Jiangxi   3.29             
 
The second data set we utilize is a city-level one which comes mainly from a survey on the 
investment climate of Chinese prefecture-level cities conducted by the World Bank and the 
Enterprise Survey Organization of China in 2005 (World Bank, 2007). The survey sampled 
100 industrial firms in each city except for four municipalities where 200 industrial firms 
were sampled respectively to evaluate the investment climate of 120 cities from almost all of 
the Chinese provinces. Cai, Fang and Xu (2009) argue that travel and entertainment costs 
(ETC) can be a efficient measure of corruption in Chinese firms since “Chinese managers 
commonly use the ETC accounting category to reimburse expenditures used to bribe 
government officials, to entertain clients and suppliers, or to accommodate managerial 10 
 
excess” (p. 2). And they provide strong evidence that “firm’s ETC consists of a mix that 
includes expenditures on government officials both as ‘grease money’ and ‘protection 
money’, implicit CEO pay, and managerial excesses” (p. 22). Therefore we plausibly employ 
the average travel and entertainment costs relative to the sales of investigated firms in a city 
(AETC, henceforth) as a proxy for the corruption level of the city as AETC derived from 
representative firms in Chinese industrialized cites can indirectly reflect the overall levels of 
corruption there. Statistic details of this variable can be found in World Bank (2007). The 
detailed description of other variables utilized in the current analysis is given in the 
Appendix. 
                                           
3.1  Province-level Analysis 
To compare corruption in China, the largest developing country, to that in America, the 
largest developed country, our basic specification to investigate the causes of corruption is 
similar to that of Glaeser and Saks (2006): 
 
        Registered Cases on Corruption = α + γ•Income + δ•Education + η•Anti-corruption 
                                                                   +  β • Other regional characteristics + Error term 
 
We measure the regional income level using the logarithm of real Gross Regional Product per 
capita and the level education with the proportion of the regional population over 6 that have 
completed a college degree. This is consistent with Glaeser and Saks (2006) who also 
included the regional income and education level in their specifications. We also try to get a 
measure of regional anti-corruption efforts among the control variables. Since the law 
systems in different Chinese regions are the same, the difference in the anti-corruption efforts 
of the various regions lies in the individual regional legal enforcements against corruption. 
We hence use, similar to Goel and Nelson (1998), the real per capita expenditure on police, 
procuratorate, court and judiciary by local government as a proxy for the regional anti-
corruption effort. Controlling for anti-corruption efforts is insofar useful as provincial 
registered cases on corruption may also reflect the effort that local governments have made to 
fight against corruption (Treisman, 2007). We also add in our cross-sectional analysis a 
geographic dummy that is equal 1 for the provinces in North China. The dummy variable 
takes into account that there are cultural differences between North and South China. These 
cultural differences may be driven by individualism, one of Hofstede's five cultural 
dimensions (Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005). People in North China are more collectivistic 11 
 
than people in South China (Eberhard, 1965). Interestingly, Banfield (1958) and Hooper 
(1995) have confirmed a link between the propensity to favour in group members 
(collectivism) and official corruption in Spain and Italy respectively. Thus, we may predict 
that a higher level of collectivism might lead to more frequent incidences of corruption in 
North China.  
      We first run cross-sectional regressions with a 10-year average of corruption variable to 
mitigate the data noise problem, which was similar to the one that Glaeser and Saks (2006) 
confronted. To deal with the potential reverse causality between the income level and the 
incidence of corruption which Treisman (2000) and Glaeser and Saks (2006) pointed out, we, 
according to Hall and Jones (1999) and Rappaport and Sachs (2003), use geographic 
characteristics (latitudes of provincial capitals and a dummy variable indicating provincial 
proximities to oceans) as instruments for the provincial levels of income. Our selection of 
instrumental variables is mainly based on the long-standing fact that there exists both an 
economic fault line between North China and South China since the Song dynasty, and also a 
great income gap between coastal and inland provinces in China since the opening of the 
treaty ports in the late Qing dynasty (Li, 2001). Our selected geographic instruments are 
highly correlated with these regional disparities and hence also with regional economic 
development. Furthermore we cannot image that the instrumental variables affect corruption 
directly or through channels other than economic development. We therefore have reason to 
believe that our instruments are valid. Due to the lack of valid instruments, we adopt the 
lagged value (data from the 1990 Census) of the education variable in regressions to address 
the similar endogeneity problem of the variable education.  
      Our cross-sectional analysis using the IV approach, though addressing the problems of 
endogeneity and data noise, has the problem of small sample size. We therefore then operate 
a panel analysis using fixed effects regressions with a large panel sample. The panel analysis 
controls the endogeneity problem and the data noise by regional fixed effects and time fixed 
effects. However, it is obvious that time fixed effects can only control part of the data noise. 
Moreover, fixed effects regressions cannot correct the bias caused by the time-varying 
omitted variables. The causes of corruption in China therefore can be better explained by the 
combination of both IV and fixed effects results.  
 
3.1.1 Deterrence and Corruption 
In this section, we will empirically test the relationship between deterrence and corruption. 
We first examine the correlation between corruption and income, education and anti-12 
 
corruption effort. Our approach is similar to the one conducted by Glaeser and Saks (2006). 
This has the advantage that we are better able to compare the results between the biggest 
developed market economy (US) and the largest developing and transitional economy. The 
results are presented in Table 3. It can be seen that income is positively correlated with 
corruption in China. In estimations the coefficient is statistically significant. This relationship 
seems at first glance puzzling since it contradicts the previous literature. However, such a 
result might be driven by the transitional nature of Chinese society. It is worth noting that 
countries making the transition to a market economy often experience unprecedented 
corruption during their transition (Levin and Satarov, 2000 and Paldam and Svendsen, 2000). 
According to the World Bank (2000, p.vii), “the simultaneous processes of developing a 
market economy, designing new political and social institutions and redistributing social 
assets have created fertile ground for corruption” in transitional countries. The increase in 
corruption in these countries seemed therefore to be a consequence of the transition. 
Specifically, China started its transitional process with economic reform loosening up the 
economy while political reform lagged behind. Government hence continues to play an 
extensive role in the economic environment in the absence of institutional and legal 
constraints. One of the consequences is unavoidably corruption. Furthermore, this kind of 
corruption will be more pervasive if government power is widened through increased 
economic activities.  Thus, regions with a higher level of income might therefore be more 
corrupt.  
      In order to determine the direction of the causality between income and corruption, we as 
discussed previously adopted the instruments for income, namely latitudes and proximities to 
oceans in our regressions. These instruments have proven to be suitable for income level and 
passed the identification test and the weak identification test in our case (Table 3). Similar to 
Gundlach and Paldam (2009), the main direction in the circular relationship between income 
and corruption in China is from income to corruption since the Hausman tests show that the 
IV estimates do not differ systematically from the corresponding OLS estimates in all the 
cross-section regressions reported in Table 3, which means there is not significant upward 
bias caused by reverse causality. This result, which is robust when including more control 







Relationship between annual corruption rate and levels of income, education and anti-corruption 
efforts 
  Average Annual Cases (1998-2007)  Annual Cases (1998-2007) 
  OLS  IV  Pooled-OLS    Fixed  effects
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)    (6) 
Income   0.95***  0.89**  1.16***  1.15***  0.61***    0.56** 
   (0.30)  (0.34)  (0.33)  (0.33) (0.11)   (0.22) 
Education     0.090    0.063  0.045***    0.029 
     (0.13)    (0.12)  (0.018)    (0.020) 
Anti-corruption   -0.0055***  -0.0070*** -0.0061*** -0.0074** -0.0070***    -0.0053*** 
    (0.0015) (0.0025)  (0.0016) (0.0031)  (0.00073)   (0.00081) 
North   0.81***  0.73***  0.74***  0.71***  0.72***     
   (0.20)  (0.20)  (0.19)  (0.19)  (0.097)     
Constant   -4.94*  -4.36  -6.64**  -6.54**  -2.30**    -2.17 
   (2.47)  (2.79)  (2.71)  (2.72) (0.98)   (1.94) 
1
st stage F 
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Time fixed effects                Yes 
Region fixed effects                Yes  
Observations   31  31  31  31  310    310 
R-squared    0.52 0.53  0.51 0.52  0.33    0.56 
Notes:  
a.  Robust standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets, critical values in braces,   *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1.    
b.  Unless noted otherwise, we hereafter use the value in 1990 of the education variable, the average value 
during 1997-2006 of the anti-corruption efforts variable and the values in 1997 of the other explanatory 
variables in the cross-section regressions. And we utilize the one-year lagged values of explanatory variables 
henceforth in the panel regressions. 
 
We then perform fixed-effects regressions with the panel data from 1998 to 2007. We use 
lagged values of levels of income and education in the regressions since registered cases on 
corruption in one year actually reflect the number of corrupt acts done previously but 
detected in the year. We consider time fixed effects in our panel estimation to control anti-
corruption campaigns the Chinese government launched in some years within our 
investigation period. The panel results shown in Table 3 are generally in line with our cross-
sectional findings. The coefficient for income is in both cases statistically significant. We 
also observe a positive relationship between education and corruption. However, the 
coefficient is mostly not statistically significant. On the other hand, we observe that the anti-14 
 
corruption efforts significantly depress corruption in China. Last but not least, we find in 
Table 3 that in line with our prediction, northern provinces have significantly higher levels of 
corruption than southern provinces in China.  
      We now explore whether the negative relationship between income and corruption in 
literature will emerge in China. Basu and Li (2000) predicted theoretically that corruption 
levels in transitional countries will decrease after these countries establish or improve 
institutions, effectively checking the abuse of public office as the transition processes move 
on. The depressing influence of income level on corruption will then dominate. This 
prediction has been confirmed in several Eastern European countries (World Bank, 2006). 
Primary evidence of this trend in China is shown in Table 4, where the size of the positive 
effect of income on corruption during 2003-2007 is 30% lower than that during 1998-2002, 
which implies that the positive effects of income on corruption levels in China do decrease as 
reforms continue.  
 
 Table 4 
  The Effect of income on corruption rate in 1998-2002 and 2003-2007 
  Average Annual Cases (1998-2002)    Average Annual Cases (2003-2007) 
 (1) (2)    (3)  (4) 
Income 1.33***  1.30***    0.97***  0.96*** 
 (0.39)  (0.39)    (0.30)  (0.30) 
Education   0.044      0.062 
   (0.14)      (0.10) 
Anti-corruption -0.0088***  -0.010**   -0.0042***  -0.0051*** 
 (0.0030)  (0.0049)    (0.0010)  (0.0016) 
North 0.79*** 0.78***   0.70***  0.66*** 
 (0.23)  (0.22)    (0.17)  (0.18) 
Constant -7.90**  -7.69**    -5.17**  -5.06** 
 (3.24)  (3.21)    (2.52)  (2.51) 
Observations  31 31   31 31 
R-squared  0.48 0.49   0.49 0.50 
 Notes: 
a.  Robust standard errors in parentheses,   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
b.  We here adopt the average values during the periods of 1998-2002 and 2002-2007 of the Anti-corruption 
effort variable in the first two columns and the others respectively. 
 
Further evidence about the tendency of the relationship between income and corruption is 
provided in Table 5. We measure the change in corruption by the difference between the 
provincial average corruption rates over the 5-year periods 1998–2002 and 2003–2007, and 
then regress the change on the initial levels of income, education and corruption (averages in 
the period 1998-2002). The strong negative coefficients on the initial corruption level in the 15 
 
regressions may show that provincial corruption levels will converge to their steady state 
levels over time after the transitional shocks initially caused them to depart from their steady 
state levels. Furthermore, provinces with higher levels of income seem to have experienced 
larger decreases in corruption during the past decade although one should note that the 
coefficient is statistically insignificant.  In summary, all evidence here implies that as 
predicted theoretically, the negative effect of income on corruption in China may emerge in 
the future. 
 
            Table 5 
Relationship between the change in corruption and initial levels of income, education and  
corruption 
  Change in corruption between 1998-2002 and 2003-2007 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Income   -0.099  -0.026 
   (0.25)  (0.24) 
Education 0.051    0.051 
 (0.041)    (0.039) 
Average  Annual  Cases  -0.33*** -0.29*** -0.32*** 
(1998-2002)  (0.049) (0.057) (0.058) 
-0.0031* -0.0011  -0.0031  Difference in anti-corruption  
between 1998-2002 and 2003-2007 (0.0016)  (0.0019)  (0.0022) 
Constant 0.80***  1.44  1.00 
  (0.23) (1.91) (1.82) 
Observations  31 31 31 
R-squared  0.51 0.50 0.51 
             Notes:  
             Robust standard errors in parentheses,    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.       
 
Traditional media in China, such as newspaper, radio and television is owned and therefore 
fully controlled by the state, while internet as a new media, though also censored by Chinese 
government, is relatively less constrained due to its technical flexibility. Actually there are 
many recent cases in China where internet users uncover official malfeasance and corruption 
of officials in order to force them out of office (Freedom House, 2009). A question hence 
emerges whether we can expect media to effectively act as an external control of corruption 
in China as suggested by Brunetti and Weder (2003) from an international perspective. We 
here employ the regional newspaper circulation per capita (following Pellegrini and Gerlagh, 
2008) and provincial internet penetration rates to investigate the effects of media, controlled 




  Table 6 
  Relationship between corruption rate and media                                                 
  Average Annual Cases (1998-2007)   Annual Cases (1998-2007) 
 IV    Fixed  effects 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)    (6) 
Newspaper 0.0029    -0.029**  -0.0048***     -0.0049*** 
 (0.0062)    (0.011)  (0.00063)      (0.00064) 
Internet     -0.61**  -1.25***    -0.0063    -0.013 
   (0.25)  (0.30)    (0.022)    (0.016) 
Income 1.09***  0.86***  1.21***  0.55***  0.56**    0.56*** 
 (0.35)  (0.25)  (0.31)  (0.20) (0.22)   (0.20) 
Education    0.053 0.31** 0.65*** 0.10***  0.032    0.11*** 
 (0.13)  (0.14)  (0.16)  (0.017)  (0.023)    (0.019) 
Anti-corruption -0.0076**  -0.0069*** -0.0040** -0.0044*** -0.0051***   -0.0040*** 
 (0.0032)  (0.0024)  (0.0018)  (0.00061)  (0.00091)    (0.00075) 
North 0.73***  0.66***  0.37*         
 (0.21)  (0.18)  (0.22)         
Constant -5.99**  -4.30**  -7.35***  -2.62  -2.19    -2.67 
 (2.94)  (2.03)  (2.66)  (1.79) (1.94)   (1.79) 
Observations 31  31    308  310    308 
R-squared  0.52  0.62   0.62 0.56   0.62 
Time fixed effects        Yes   Yes    Yes  
Region fixed effects        Yes   Yes    Yes  
  Notes:  
a.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
b.  We here use the value of internet penetration rates in 1998 in the cross-section regressions. 
 
Evidence in Table 6 seems to be moderate. Controlling levels of income, education and anti-
corruption efforts, we find in cross-sectional regressions (the first three columns) that the 
internet media play an important role in disclosing bureaucratic corruption in China while the 
role of traditional media here seems to be weaker (statistically significant with a negative sign 
in specification (3)). However, the panel estimation results in the last three columns show that 
the traditional media newspapers significantly depress corruption in China while internet 
media do not. Nevertheless, the overall tendency suggest that both traditional and internet 
media in China do exert negative effects on corruption even if they are (partly) controlled by 
the Chinese government. Anti-corruption, as long as it is held within limits, can also be in the 
interest of nondemocratic governments. 
         Now we briefly review the modern history of China before we explore the impact of the 
common law system on corruption in China. During the last period of Qing Dynasty (1840-
1911), China was beaten in a sequence of wars against foreign colonial powers. As a result, 
foreign powers including Britain carved spheres of influence out of China through a series of 17 
 
unequal treaties. They, according to their own values, influenced or even reconstructed the 
local administration systems including the legal system, infrastructure and education within 
the domains they controlled. These influences may persist to cause some regional differences 
in current China. We hence introduce a dummy indicating whether a province was in the 
influence sphere of Britain in the late Qing Dynasty, to capture the influence of the common 
law system on current Chinese provinces.  
 
        Table 7 
        Influence of the common law system on corruption rate 
  Average Annual Cases (1998-2007)  Annual Cases (1998-2007) 
 IV  Fixed  effects 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
British   -0.18    -0.11  -0.21**    -0.18* 
 (0.15)    (0.21)  (0.088)    (0.093) 
Church university    -0.46***  -0.45***    -0.21***  -0.20*** 
    (0.17) (0.17)    (0.078) (0.077) 
income  1.11*** 1.70***  1.66***  0.58**  0.69*** 0.70*** 
 (0.31)  (0.37)  (0.37)  (0.22) (0.24) (0.24) 
education  0.090 0.060  0.077  0.026 0.029 0.027 
 (0.12)  (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) 
Anti-corruption -0.0079***  -0.0086** -0.0088*** -0.0052*** -0.0056***  -0.0055***
 (0.0026)  (0.0034)  (0.0031)  (0.00081) (0.00080) (0.00080) 
North 0.54***  0.35  0.25       
 (0.15)  (0.23)  (0.24)       
Constant  -6.01**  -10.75*** -10.28***  -2.35 -3.36 -3.47 
 (2.57)  (2.95)  (2.97)  (2.00) (2.10) (2.15) 
Observations  31  31 31  310 310 310 
R-squared  0.53 0.57  0.57  0.56 0.57 0.57 
Time fixed effects        Yes   Yes   Yes  
Region fixed effects        Yes   Yes   Yes  
        Notes:  
        Robust standard errors in parentheses.   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Specifically, education founded by Britain and the US in China, might be the key point to the 
historical influence of the common law system. F.L. Hawks Pott, the president of Saint 
John’s University founded by the American Episcopal Church, said in 1890: “in our school, 
we trained China's future teachers and propagators, making them the leaders and comperes in 
the future and casting the greatest influences on the future China”(Yang and Ye, 1993, p. 
289). Soochow University founded by the American Methodist Missionaries in 1900 was 
very famous for its education on Anglo-American law in China. We therefore also use the 
numbers of church universities founded by Britain and the US in each province till 1922 to 
proxy for the historical influence of the common law system. Results in Table 7 show the 18 
 
tendency that provinces affected by the British common law system historically have a lower 
level of corruption than the other provinces in China, which is consistent with Treisman’s 
(2000) cross-country finding.   
In Table 8 we turn to the role of social heterogeneity. Firstly, in line with the cross-
country finding, we observe that higher income inequality measured by Gini coefficients 
(Meng, Gregory and Wang, 2007) significantly raises the incidence of corruption in China. 
Secondly, we test the relationship between racial fractionalization and corruption in China. 
As discussed before, ethnic fractionalization may have a positive effect on corruption since 
corrupt officials may be still supported by their own ethnic groups due to political reason. In 
China the Han nationality is the major nationality, which accounts for, according to the 
national census in 2000, 91.6% of the total population of China although there are altogether 
56 nationalities in China
2. In provinces such as Jiangsu and Shanxi where almost all (more 
than 99.6%) residents belong to the Han people, the influence of ethnic diversity is probably 
not perceived since ethnic minorities there might be too small to protect the corrupt officials. 
We therefore need to control the regional population share of Han nationality when we 
investigate the effect of ethnic fractionalization on corruption. We measure the ethnic 
fractionalization in China with the dissimilarity index. It is calculated as one minus a 
Herfindahl concentration index, 1-∑si
2, where si is the population share of nationality i, from 
the national census in 2000. We use the values derived from the 2000 national census to 
depict the ethnic fractionalization in Chinese provinces in the investigation period because 
the provincial nationality compositions of population in China are relatively stable during a 
decade. However, it prevents us from running fixed effects regressions in our panel analysis. 
We instead perform the Pooled OLS regressions controlling time fixed effects in the panel 
section. The empirical findings support our analysis: the population share of Han nationality 
is negatively correlated with corruption. Controlling regional population shares of Han 
nationality, we further find that the dissimilarity index is negatively associated with the local 
corruption level (see Table 8). Given that the Han nationality dominates in most Chinese 
provinces, a small regional dissimilarity index may imply that there is at least one ethnic 
minority in the province that is populous enough to shelter its corruption officials. The 
                                                            
2 There are 56 ethnic groups in China. Except the Han nationality, other 55 ethnic groups in China are 
customarily referred to as ethnic minorities. According to the national census in 2000, 37 ethnic minorities have 
a population of less than one million. Among them, there are 20 ethnic groups with a population of below 
100,000. The smallest ethnic group, Lhoba, only has the population of 2,965. Like the Han people, ethnic 
minorities also can be found throughout the country. 19 
 
negative relationship between the dissimilarity index and corruption actually means that 
ethnic fractionalization promotes local corruption in Chinese provinces. Combining the above 
findings, we then conclude that ethnic fractionalization increases corruption in China.  
 
        Table 8 
         Relationship between corruption rate and social heterogeneity 
  Average Annual Cases (1998-2007) Annual Cases (1998-2007) 
 IV  FE  Pooled OLS 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Gini   9.42**      7.12**     
 (4.78)      (3.58)     
Han   -0.013*  -0.021**    -0.0045**  -0.0054* 
   (0.0075)  (0.0093)    (0.0023)  (0.0031) 
Dissimilarity     -1.17*      -0.33 
     (0.63)      (0.27) 
Income    1.61*** 1.53*** 1.10**  0.68*  0.89***  0.24 
 (0.41)  (0.43)  (0.45)  (0.35) (0.15)  (0.17) 
Education    0.43*** 0.21*  0.098  -0.062 0.10***  0.017 
 (0.16)  (0.12)  (0.14)  (0.057) (0.022) (0.031) 
Anti-corruption  -0.018*** -0.012*** -0.014*** -0.0011  -0.0095*** -0.0093*** 
  (0.0048) (0.0037) (0.0040)  (0.0047) (0.0011)  (0.0013) 
North 0.51**  0.56***  0.40**       
 (0.22)  (0.20)  (0.19)       
Constant -12.24***  -8.37***  -4.25  -4.51  -4.55***  0.80 
 (3.72)  (3.01)  (2.91)  (2.94) (1.28)  (1.41) 
Observations  30 31 31  120  310 310 
R-squared  0.56 0.54 0.66  0.60  0.32  0.41 
Time fixed effects        Yes   Yes   Yes  
Region fixed effects        Yes   No   No  
         Notes: 
a.  Robust standard errors in parentheses    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
b.  We do not have the Gini Coefficients of Tibet.   
c.  We also control provincial shares of urban population in specifications (3) and (7) as people from the 
same ethnic group often gather together in rural area hence exert stronger effect on corruption than 
those in urban area.       
 
Finally we explore the effect of the public sector’s relative wage, which can be seen as a 
proxy for the public officials’ opportunity cost to behave corrupt. Consistent with the cross-
country evidence reported by Treisman (2000), our results in Table 9 strongly support 
previous theoretical prediction that the relative wage is negatively correlated with the 





                             Table 9 




 Annual  Cases 
(1998-2007) 
 IV   Fixed  effects 
 (1)    (2) 
Relative wage   -2.80**    -0.54* 
 (1.17)    (0.32) 
income 1.68***    0.56*** 
 (0.42)    (0.21) 
Education   -0.029    0.027 
 (0.13)    (0.020) 
Anti-corruption -0.0074**    -0.0052*** 
 (0.0034)    (0.00079) 
North 0.55**     
 (0.22)     
Constant -7.73***    -1.59 
 (2.72)    (1.95) 
Observations 31    310 
R-squared 0.48    0.56 
Time fixed effects      Yes 
Region fixed effects      Yes 
                             Notes: 
a.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
b.  We use the average values of relative wages of government employee during 1997-2006 
in the cross-section regression. 
 
 
3.1.2 Discretionary Power, Economic Rents and Corruption 
Lord Acton, a British historian in 19th century, remarked: “Power tends to corrupt, and 
absolute power corrupts absolutely.”
3 In this subsection we therefore explore the relationship 
between discretionary power, related economic rents and corruption in China.  
  In Table 10 we first examine the relationship between fiscal decentralization and the 
regional corruption level. Following Zhang and Zou (1998), we measure fiscal 
decentralization in China with the ratio of per capita provincial consolidated spending to per 
capita central consolidated spending. Due to the fact that our fiscal decentralization variable 
is highly correlated with income we only report panel regressions with this variable. In 
specification (3) we can observe that fiscal decentralization decreases local corruption levels. 
Such a finding is consistent with Fisman and Gatti (2002a, 2002b). Actually Montinola, Qian 
and Weingast (1998) argued that China has a unique market-preserving federal system where 
                                                            
3 Lord Acton, 1887, Letter to Bishop Mandell Creighton. 21 
 
local governments have strong fiscal incentives to support local business development and 
hence restrict their own predation on local enterprises. The view of Shleifer and Vishny 
(1993) that decentralization results in “excess” rent extraction due to the lack of coordination 
among officials therefore may not apply in China.  
 
       Table 10 
       Relationship between corruption rate and discretionary power of the local government 
  Average Annual Cases (1998-2007) Annual Cases (1998-2007) 
 IV  Fixed  effects 
   (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)  (5) 
Fiscal decentralization          -0.019***     
         (0.0059)     
Government size    0.079        0.052*   
   (0.053)        (0.028)   
Marketilization     -0.20***        -0.22** 
     (0.076)        (0.086) 
Income     1.27***  2.19***    0.60***  0.58***  1.63*** 
   (0.32)  (0.53)    (0.22)  (0.21)  (0.56) 
Education     -0.055  0.32***    0.029  0.0041  0.018 
   (0.14)  (0.094)    (0.020) (0.022) (0.031) 
Anti-corruption   -0.0061*  -0.018***    -0.0049*** -0.0052***  -0.0089***
   (0.0033)  (0.0038)    (0.00081)  (0.00079)  (0.0015) 
North   0.79***  0.32         
   (0.20)  (0.25)         
Constant   -8.36***  -13.65***    -2.51  -2.72  -9.89** 
   (2.83)  (4.023)    (1.95)  (1.92)  (4.52) 
Observations   31  30    310  310  155 
R-squared   0.51  0.55    0.56  0.56  0.60 
Time fixed effects          Yes   Yes  Yes 
Region fixed effects          Yes  Yes  Yes 
       Notes: 
a.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
b.  We use the marketization index in 1997 in the cross-sectional analysis and those from 2001to 2005 in 
our panel analysis. 
 
We then turn to the linkage between the provincial government size and local corruption 
rates. Similar to LaPalombara (1994), we utilize the ratio of regional consolidated revenue to 
Gross Regional Product to measure the provincial government size. We find that the 
provincial corruption rate appears to increase with the provincial government size, which is 
consistent with previous studies such as Goel and Nelson (1998). The Chinese market-
preserving federal system, which to some extent limits local governments’ expropriation, 
might account for the weak effect of local government size here. We finally investigate the 
effect of government regulation on local corruption level. Here we use the provincial 22 
 
marketization index of China from Fan, Wang, and Zhu (2001, 2006) to measure the 
provincial government regulation. With 19 indicators, the index covers five main aspects of 
the Chinese marketization: the relationship between the market and the government, the 
growth of the non-state economy, the development of the product market, the development of 
the factor market, and the market environment including intermediaries and institutional and 
jurisdictional arrangements. Thus, this index is negatively related to the degree of regulation 
since marketization is connected with the deregulation of government. Unlike Treisman 
(2000) and Glaeser and Saks (2006), our regressions including the provincial marketization 
index, strongly confirm that government regulations promote while deregulation depresses 
corruption in China.  
      We now focus on the role of economic rents. In this instance we are going to test the 
associations between the corruption level and several other factors influencing the scale of 
economic rents in China. We first find in Table 11 that regional trade openness, measured by 
the regional share of imports in Gross Regional Product, significantly lowers the provincial 
level of corruption in China. The fixed effects approach in our estimation addresses the 
potential simultaneity bias suggested by Treisman (2000). The abundance of natural 
resources is hypothesized to be an inducement to corruption because of the associated 
economic rents. Since the export share of natural resources, proposed by Ades and Di Tella 
(1999), is not suitable to measure the regional abundance of natural resource in within-
country analysis, we, following Xu and Wang (2006), use the fraction of employment in the 
mining and quarrying sector as a proxy for the provincial abundance of natural resources in 
China. The results in Table 11 indicate that the abundance of natural resources is significantly 
correlated with higher level of corruption. 
      We further investigate the relationship between the size of the state-owned enterprise 
sector and corruption. The state-owned enterprise sector plays an important role in Chinese 
economy. Due to the soft budget constraints and the lack of monitoring, managers and 
officials who have rights over the state-owned enterprises they administrate can easily extract 
economic rents from the state-owned enterprises. Abundant economic rents in the state-
owned enterprises are within easy reach of them. Therefore the corruption level might be 
positively correlated with the size of the state-owned enterprise sector. Using the share of 
employment of the state-owned enterprise sector as a proxy for its size, we provide clear 




         Table 11 
         Relationship between corruption rate and economic rents 
  Average Annual Cases (1998-2007) Annual Cases (1998-2007) 
 IV  Fixed  effects 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Openness   -0.017***      -0.020***     
 (0.0060)      (0.0037)     
Resource     0.057**      0.054***   
   (0.026)      (0.013)   
State-owned       3.32*      3.32** 
     (2.06)      (1.41) 
Income   1.22***  1.26***  1.04***  0.73***  0.59***  0.43* 
 (0.32)  (0.32)  (0.32)  (0.22) (0.21) (0.24) 
Education 0.11  0.049  -0.045  0.065***  0.023  -0.0045 
  (0.088)  (0.12) (0.13)  (0.019) (0.019) (0.028) 
Anti-corruption -0.0055**  -0.0065** -0.0072*** -0.0029*** -0.0043***  -0.0051***
  (0.0027) (0.0031) (0.0027)  (0.00097) (0.00081) (0.00088) 
North 0.66***  0.48**  0.54***       
 (0.19)  (0.24)  (0.20)       
Constant  -7.24*** -7.79*** -5.73**  -4.34**  -2.92  -1.12 
 (2.71)  (2.65)  (2.60)  (2.01) (1.89) (2.14) 
Observations  31 31 31  310 310 248 
R-squared  0.56 0.55 0.56  0.58  0.58  0.60 
Time fixed effects        Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region fixed effects        Yes  Yes  Yes 
         Notes: 
         Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
3.1.3   Panel Data Evidences  
We now perform a panel data analysis with full specification using a panel of 31 Chinese 
provincial regions over a period of ten years to test the robustness of our previous results. The 
main explanatory variables in the previous regressions are all included in our current 
specifications. We successively adopt pooled-OLS, FGLS and fixed effects approaches to re-
examine the above results. We use the feasible generalized least squares method here in order 
to allow estimation in the presence of autocorrelation within panels and heteroskedasticity 
across panels. Our panel results are presented in Table 12. Results in columns of Table 12 are 
similar in general, which shows the robustness of the obtained findings. More importantly, 
panel estimates here are consistent with previous estimates though the correlations between 
some independent variables make their estimation less precise, especially when the sample 
size decreases. It therefore shows that our empirical findings about the determinants of the 
provincial corruption rate in China are robust to the different specifications and econometric 
methods. To compare the relative strength of determinants of corruption in China, we also list 24 
 
their standardized (beta) coefficients in specifications (5) and (6) in Table 12. The last 
question that remains to be examined in our current study therefore is whether our findings 
are still robust when applying them to a different data set. To answer this question we will, in 
the next subsection, explore the city-level data set instead of the current province-level data.  
 
Table 12 
Relationship between corruption rate and its determinants: panel data analysis 
  Annual Cases (1998-2007) 
 Pooled-OLS  FGLS  Fixed  effects 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Income 1.47***  2.81***    1.08***  2.72***  0.83***      [0.54]  2.39***      [1.29] 
 (0.18)  (0.46)  (0.19)  (0.37)  (0.20)  (0.57) 
Education 0.095***  0.059*  0.058***  0.031  0.11***      [0.46]  0.065**      [0.25] 
 (0.021)  (0.036)  (0.020)  (0.027) (0.018)  (0.031) 
Anti-corruption   -0.0046***  -0.00072  -0.0039***  -0.0015  -0.0037*** [-0.35]  -0.0022       [-0.17] 
 (0.0011)  (0.0031)  (0.0013)  (0.0021)  (0.0010)  (0.0031) 
Newspaper -0.0027***  -0.0033***  -0.0016*  -0.0019*  -0.0037***  [-0.35]  -0.0046***  [-0.38] 
 (0.00059)  (0.0011)  (0.00082)  (0.0011)  (0.00073)  (0.0012) 
University   -0.33***  -0.42***  -0.19***  -0.26***  -0.10           [-0.083]  -0.30**       [-0.22] 
 (0.072)  (0.12)  (0.066)  (0.096)  (0.074)  (0.13) 
Han  -0.0027  0.0038  -0.0013  -0.00016  -0.0066**   [-0.15]  0.0027        [0.057] 
 (0.0023)  (0.0054)  (0.0030)  (0.0043)  (0.0027)  (0.0054) 
Relative wage  -0.43  -1.09*  -0.36  -1.25***  -0.64**       [-0.084]  -1.13*         [-0.12] 
 (0.31)  (0.59)  (0.32)  (0.48)  (0.31)  (0.66) 
Decentralization  -0.034***  -0.28***  -0.016**  -0.27***  -0.021***   [-0.087]  -0.20**       [-0.47] 
 (0.0058)  (0.088)  (0.0065)  (0.069)  (0.0038)  (0.096) 
Openness  -0.0079*  -0.0049  -0.0060  -0.0057  -0.0071*     [-0.17]  0.0012        [0.027] 
 (0.0041)  (0.0069)  (0.0041)  (0.0061)  (0.0044)  (0.0073) 
Resource 0.070***  0.038  0.058***  0.039*  0.047***     [0.19]  0.038**      [0.13] 
 (0.014)  (0.024)  (0.015)  (0.020) (0.014)  (0.019) 
Marketilization     -0.30***    -0.25***    -0.39***     [-0.75] 
   (0.090)    (0.070)    (0.12) 
Constant -10.48***  -18.43***  -6.90***  -18.45***  -4.41**  -14.96*** 
 (1.51)  (3.53)  (1.64)  (2.89)  (1.80)  (4.49) 
Observations 308  154  308  154  308  154 
R-squared 0.55  0.58      0.65  0.68 
Time fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes    Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region fixed 
effects 
No No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Notes: 
a.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Beta coefficients in Brackets. 
b.  Since we only have the Gini Coefficient data during 1997-2000, we do not introduce it into our panel 






3.2   City-level Analysis 
Using an alternative data set at the city-level gives us the chance to check the robustness of 
the above findings. Specifically we will use a different corruption measure (AETC) to 
replicate the above analysis. As discussed before, AETC is the average travel and 
entertainment costs relative to the sales of investigated firms in Chinese cities in the survey 
conducted by World Bank in 2005. Prior literature (World Bank, 2007, Cai, Fang, and Xu, 
2009) has proved that the travel and entertainment costs relative to the sales of firms are the 
eligible indirect measure for corruption in Chinese cities. However, one should note that less 
data is available at the city level. For example, we are not able to explore the effect of social 
heterogeneity on corruption in Chinese cities.  
      Similar to province-level analysis, our baseline specification here is  
 
          AETC = α + γ•log (Industrial output per worker) + δ•Education + η•Anti-corruption 
                           + β•Other city characteristics + Error term 
 
Since corruption indicators here are drawn from industrial firms, we accordingly use the 
industrial output per worker in 2003 to reflect local economic development, which is 
plausible since China is undergoing industrialization. We also employ fractions of workers 
with college completed in 1991 to represent the education levels of cities (lagged values). 
The average confidence in the courts of local firms investigated is utilized as a proxy for local 
anti-corruption efforts since impartial and efficient courts can prevent expropriation and 
hence can significantly promote anti-corruption. We will not adopt the same dummy as in the 
province-level analysis to proxy cultural difference. Cities in our data set are the most 
developed areas in China and attract people from different parts of the country. The culture in 
these cities is hence mixed and difficult to identify. We instead generate a dummy “big city” 
to control the difference of the administration authority between cities. It indicates whether a 
city belongs to a group of cities with more autonomy rights both in lawmaking and 
administration and which contains municipalities, capitals of provinces. These cities are 
specifically designated in the state plan and special economic zones in China. This dummy 
actually reflects the different degrees of administrative decentralization among Chinese cities 
(Cai and Treisman, 2006). We will discuss this political decentralization dummy together 
with the fiscal decentralization variable later. 26 
 
            To deal with the endogeneity problem of the economic development discussed 
previously, we similarly use geographic characteristics, namely the longitudes of cities and a 
dummy variable indicating whether a city is in the coastal areas, as instruments for economic 
development. Unlike previously implemented, we use here the number of colleges and 
universities in each city in 1948 (before the establishment of the People’s Republic of China) 
as an instrumental variable for the education level of the city to deal with the potential reverse 
causality between education and corruption. 
      Due to the data limitations, we are only able replicate the main part of the province-level 
analysis. We first re-examine the relationship between corruption and the levels of economic 
development and education in Chinese cities. Results are shown in Table 13.    
 
                Table 13 
Relationship between corruption and levels of economic development and education in 
Chinese cities 
 AETC  (2005) 
 OLS  IV 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Income -0.20**    -0.20**  -0.25    -0.34* 
 (0.085)    (0.089)  (0.21)    (0.18) 
Education   0.0095  0.010    -0.044  -0.0044 
   (0.011)  (0.011)   (0.035)  (0.024) 
Anti-corruption -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.011*** 
  (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0022)  (0.0022) (0.0027) (0.0023) 
Big city  0.22***  0.15*  0.21**  0.24**  0.20**  0.26** 
 (0.080)  (0.083)  (0.080) (0.11)  (0.098)  (0.11) 
Constant  4.20*** 1.73*** 4.15***  4.84*  2.23*** 5.99*** 
  (1.03) (0.20) (1.03)  (2.53) (0.39) (2.16) 
1
st  stage  F      13.77   14.95 
(income)      [0.00]   [0.00] 
1
st  stage  F       8.78  8.20 
(education)       [0.00]  [0.00] 
Observations  120 120 120  120 120 120 
R-squared 0.25 0.23 0.26  0.25 0.08 0.23 
Notes: 
a.  Robust standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets . *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
b.  Unless noted otherwise, we henceforth use the value in 1991 of the education variable, the value 
in 2003 of the income variable, and the value in 2004 of the anti-corruption strength variable in 
our regressions. 
 
Our results show that the economic development weakly depresses the corruption level of the 
prefecture-level cities in China. The cities investigated here are the most developed areas in 
China since they only cover 36% of prefecture-level areas but account for 70 to 80% of 
Chinese GDP (World Bank, 2007).  Almost all pilot cities for economic reform and special 27 
 
economic zones in China are included in our data set. It is therefore natural that the negative 
effect of economic development on corruption emerges first in these cities since reforms 
started earlier there compared to other areas in China and hence also generated more progress 
during the transitional process.  
      Even with an efficient instrument we still cannot find solid evidence of the effect of 
education on local corruption in China. Nonetheless, the negative sign of the education 
variable in the IV regressions could gives a clue to our previous conjuncture that, similar to 
that of economic development, the negative effect of education on corruption may emerge as 
the transition process advances in China. In line with previous findings we also observe that 
anti-corruption strength is found to strongly deter local corruption in Chinese cities. 
 
 
                                 Table 14 
   Relationship between corruption and other deterrents to corruption in Chinese cities 
 AETC  (2005) 
 OLS  IV 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Internet -0.043**    -0.040**   
  (0.017)   (0.017)  
University   -0.050   -0.052 
   (0.068)   (0.078) 
Income -0.16*  -0.19*  -0.15  -0.21 
 (0.092)  (0.098)  (0.21)  (0.22) 
Education  0.0075 0.012  0.0026 0.0063 
 (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011) (0.011) 
Anti-corruption -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.012*** 
  (0.0022) (0.0022)  (0.0022) (0.0023) 
Big city  0.26***  0.22***  0.26**  0.24** 
 (0.086)  (0.084)  (0.10)  (0.10) 
Constant 3.62***  3.97***  3.71  4.34 
  (1.07) (1.14)  (2.47) (2.64) 
Observations  120 120  120 120 
R-squared 0.27 0.26  0.27 0.26 
                                        Notes: 
a.  Robust standard errors in parentheses   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
b.  We here adopt the value in 2004 of the internet variable in our regressions.  
   
Now we turn to the relationship between corruption and other deterrence factors (Table 14). 
Due to the data constraint working with city-level data, we only use internet terminals per 
capita in a city in 2003 as a proxy for media coverage within a city. Interestingly, we find that 
more access to the internet substantially lower the local corruption level in Chinese cities.  
Furthermore, the historical influence of the common law system, which is proxied by the 28 
 
numbers of church universities founded in cities by Britain and the US before 1922, is also 
found to exert a negative, though insignificant effect, on local corruption. According to Lenin 
(1916), China was a semi-colony of western countries headed by Britain in the past. The 
British influence in China is therefore not as strong as that of the former British colonies. It is 
therefore plausible that the effect of the common law system on corruption is weaker in 
China. 
      
                                   Table 15 
                                Relationship between corruption and discretionary power in Chinese cities 
 AETC  (2005) 
 OLS    IV 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Government size  0.11      0.14   
 (0.11)      (0.15)   
Fiscal decentralization   0.43*      0.56* 
   (0.23)      (0.34) 
Income -0.16  -0.11    -0.13  0.051 
  (0.10) (0.10)   (0.27) (0.31) 
Education  0.0093 0.010    0.0040 0.0051 
 (0.011)  (0.011)   (0.011)  (0.011) 
Anti-corruption -0.011*** -0.011***   -0.012*** -0.012*** 
  (0.0023) (0.0022)   (0.0024) (0.0022) 
Big city  0.24***  0.27***    0.25**  0.26*** 
 (0.088)  (0.089)    (0.10)  (0.10) 
Municipality   -0.30**      -0.33** 
   (0.14)      (0.15) 
Constant 3.57***  2.80**    3.28  0.94 
  (1.23) (1.29)   (3.34) (3.77) 
Observations  120 120   120 120 
R-squared  0.26 0.29   0.26 0.27 
                                Notes: 
a.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
b.  We here adopt the values in 2003 of the new explanatory variables in our regressions. 
   
In Table 15 we re-analyse the effect of discretionary power on corruption in Chinese cities. 
We first use the employment share of the city government to represent the size of the city 
government
4. We find that the city government size is positively correlated with cities’ 
corruption, but the coefficient is not statistically significant. Following Fisman and Gatti 
(2002b), we measure the extent of fiscal decentralization by the mismatch between 
government revenue and expenditure in Chinese cities and find that the fiscal decentralization 
significantly discourages corruption in Chinese cities. One should note that we add a dummy 
indicating the four municipalities among Chinese cities in regressions (2) and (4) because 
                                                            
4 We here cannot use the same measures for government size and fiscal decentralization as in the provincial 
analysis due to the lack of corresponding data. 29 
 
they are indeed provincial cities and governments there have greater powers over local public 
finance than those of other cities
5.  
As Cai and Treisman (2006) pointed out, there are three types of government 
decentralization: political decentralization, administrative decentralization and fiscal 
decentralization. According to the principal-agent framework, the effect of government 
decentralization on government corruption depends on two key mechanisms: 
interjurisdictional competition and local democracy (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006). Fiscal 
decentralization always induces the interjurisdictional competition and hence diminishes 
local bureaucrats’ ability to extract rents in their delivery of services (Brennan and Buchanan, 
1980).  Political and administrative decentralizations, however, check government corruption 
mainly through democratic pressure for re-election. It is difficult for us to empirically 
determine the effect of political decentralization on corruption in China because there is a 
steadily high political centralization where leaders of local governments are all appointed 
instead of being elected. The fiscal decentralization is shown to significantly depress local 
corruption on both a provincial level and in a city level analyses, which supports the 
argument of Brennan and Buchanan (1980). With the “big city” dummy we further find that 
the administrative decentralization substantially fosters corruption (statistically significant in 
all estimations) even when we control the fiscal decentralization. This surprising finding 
actually is in line with above analysis. The obvious lack of local democracy prevents the 
administrative decentralization from controlling the corruption of local government in China. 
Furthermore, according to Gong (2006), without the check of local democracy, an increase in 
the discretionary power of local governments due to the administrative decentralization often 
leads to more corruption of local governments.  
      We finally retest the association between the corruption level and the economic rents in 
Table 16. Similar to the previous analysis, the trade openness is found to strongly reduce 
corruption levels in Chinese cities. We then use the fraction of private enterprises among the 
firms investigated in a city to represent the extent of marketization in the city, since in China 
the private enterprises sector always increases with marketization. Marketization is also 
observed to significantly reduce corruption level in Chinese cities, which is in line with the 
previous results obtained at the province-level.  
                                                            
5 The “Municipality” dummy equals to 1 if a city belongs to the four municipalities, 0 otherwise. 30 
 
Overall, the evidence generated using city-level data supports and extends the 
findings obtained with province-level data providing. We therefore draw a comprehensive 
picture about the causes of corruption in China.  
 
 
                                   Table 16 
                               Relationship between corruption and economic rents in Chinese cities 
 AETC  (2005) 
 OLS  IV 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Openness -0.0029**   -0.0033**  
  (0.0014)   (0.0017)  
Marketization   -0.0061*    -0.0060* 
   (0.0036)    (0.0036) 
Income   -0.10  -0.17*  -0.015  -0.19 
  (0.10) (0.092)  (0.24) (0.20) 
Education 0.0062  0.0079  0.0020  0.0030 
 (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.010) (0.011) 
Anti-corruption -0.011*** -0.0096*** -0.012*** -0.011*** 
  (0.0021) (0.0023)  (0.0021) (0.0023) 
Big city  0.25***  0.18**  0.24**  0.21** 
 (0.083)  (0.079)  (0.099) (0.11) 
Constant 2.97**  4.20***  2.01  4.48** 
  (1.18) (1.03)  (2.89) (2.24) 
Observations  120 120  120 120 
R-squared 0.30 0.27  0.29 0.27 
                                   Notes: 
a.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
b.  We here adopt the values in 2004 of the new explanatory variables in our regressions. 
 
 
IV. CONCLUING REMARKS 
Cross-country analyses on corruption with subjective survey data are suffering from a 
number of biases. A comprehensive case study of a representative country might however 
prove to be a helpful supplement to these studies. In this paper, we investigated in detail the 
causes of corruption using two different sets of objective data across various regions in 
China. There are hardly any studies in existence on the causes of corruption that use within-
country data and most of those that do exist employ US data. Thus, our study complements 
previous cross-country studies by isolating possible cultural and institutional differences 
within each country. We have also complement US studies such as the one conducted by 
Glaeser and Saks (2006) using panel data and dealing therefore in a better manner with 31 
 
omitted variable biases and exploring a larger set of independent factors. Furthermore, the 
use of two different data sets and different measures of corruption allows a robust 
investigation of the causes of corruption.  
      
 















As shown in Figure 1, we found that with the exception of the positive relationship between 
income and corruption, cross-country patterns of corruption were generally maintained within 
China. We nevertheless found evidence that in China the negative effect of income on 
corruption that is frequently suggested by literature may be only temporarily overwhelmed  
and may still be in a transitional process. Furthermore in line with Treisman (2007) and 
Paldam and Gundlach (2009), our results show that the long-run causation between income 
and corruption is mainly from income to corruption. We, however, do not have enough 
evidence about the nexus of educational attainment and corruption in China though it seems 
that this connection follows the same pattern of the pattern between economic development 
and corruption. As a robust result we observe that anti-corruption efforts significantly depress 
corruption, while we similarly find strong evidence that North China seemed to be more 
corrupt than South China probably due to the fact that people in North China are more 














































evidence that even media that is under specific control of the government does indeed act as a 
control instrument for corruption in China. In addition, we now also provide within-country 
evidence which complements cross-country results that the British common law system does 
indeed adversely affect corruption. Moreover, our findings support the hypothesis that 
various social heterogeneities breed corrupt practices. Our results also support the theory that 
relatively high relative wages within the public sector prevent officials from corruption. 
      In  addition,  we  have  provided  concrete evidence that regions with higher degrees of 
regulation appear to be more corrupt. On the other hand, fiscal decentralization tends to 
discourage local corruption, which is consistent with Fisman and Gatti (2002a, b), while 
administrative decentralization seems to encourage local corruption. Finally, clear evidence 
has been given that openness substantially suppresses the incidence of corruption while an 
abundance of resources and state-owned enterprises are shown to be the breeding ground for 
corruption.      
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APPENDIX:   Data Description 
Variable Description  Source 
Cases  Provincial registered cases on corruption in 
procurator’s office  per 100,000 population 
China Procuratorial Yearbooks (1998-2008) 
 
AETC   Average travel and entertainment costs relative to sales 
of industrial firms investigated in a city 
World Bank (2007) 
Officials  Provincial number of officials investigated in registered 
cases on corruption per 100,000 population 
China Procuratorial Yearbooks (2004-2008) 
Anti-corruption  Regional expenditure on police, procuratorate, court 
and judiciary per capita 
Confidence in courts of firms investigated in a city 
China Finance Yearbooks ( 1998-2008) 
 
World Bank (2007) 
Income  Logarithm of  per capita real gross provincial product  China Statistical Yearbooks (1998-2008) 
  Industrial output per worker of the city  China City Statistical Yearbook (2004) 
Education  Regional fraction of the population over 6 with college 
completed 
China Population Statistics Yearbooks (1998-
2008), China City Statistical Yearbook (2004) 
Relative wage  Provincial ratio of average government employee’ 
wage to the average wage 
China Statistical Yearbooks (1998-2008) 
Openness  Regional ratio of import to gross regional product  Provincial Statistical Yearbooks (1998-2008), 
China City Statistical Yearbook (2004) 
Newspaper  Provincial newspapers circulation in a year  Collection of Statistics for Journalism and 
Publication in China (1998) 
Internet  Regional internet penetration rate  China Internet Network Information Centre, 
China City Statistical Yearbook (2005) 
Dissimilarity  Provincial dissimilarity index  Calculated basing the Fifth National Census of 
China (2000) 
Gini  Provincial Gini coefficients    Meng, X., Gregory R. and Wang Y., 2007. 
Poverty, inequality, and growth in urban China, 
1986–2000.  Journal of Comparative Economics  
33, 710-729. 
State-owned  the share of employment of the state-owned enterprise 
sector 
China Statistical Yearbooks (1998-2008) 
Resource   Employment share of the mining and quarrying sector  China Statistical Yearbooks (1998-2008) 
Han  Provincial population share of Han nationality   the Fifth National Census of China (2000) 
Church university  Regional number of church universities founded by 
Britain and America till 1922 
China Continuation Committee (2007), Christian 
Occupation of China. Beijing, China: Chinese 
Social Science Press. 
British  Dummy which equals 1 when a region was in influence 
sphere of Britain during the late Qing Dynasty, 0 
otherwise 
Yang, Z. and Ye, F., 1993. Studies on Semi-
colonization of Qing Dynasty. Beijing, China: 
Higher Education Press. 
Government size  The ratio of regional consolidated revenue to Gross 
Regional Product  
China Finance Yearbooks ( 1998-2008)  
China Statistical Yearbooks (1998-2008) 
  The employment share of the public sector  China City Statistical Yearbook (2004) 
Fiscal 
decentralization 
The ratio of per capita provincial consolidated spending 
to per capita central consolidated spending 
China Statistical Yearbooks (1998-2008) 
  (government expenditure – government revenue ) / 
Government expenditure 
China Finance Yearbooks ( 1998-2008), China 
City Statistical Yearbook (2004) 
Marketilization  The marketization index  Fan, G., Wang, X. and Zhu, H., 2001, 2003, 
2006. Reports on the Relative Progress of 
Marketization in Different Regions in China, 
China: Economic Science Publishing House. 
  Fraction of private firms sampled  in a city  World Bank (2007) 
Resource   The fraction of employment in the mining and 
quarrying sector 
China Statistical Yearbooks (1998-2008) 
North  Dummy which equals 1 when a province is in North 
China, 0 otherwise 
Provincial Statistical Yearbooks 1998 
Coast  Dummy which equals 1 when a region is coastal, 0 
otherwise 
Provincial Statistical Yearbooks 1998 
Latitude & 
Longitude 
Latitudes and longitudes of regional capitals or cities   Shanghai Astronomical Observatory Online 
(http://www.astron.sh.cn/) 
Big city   Dummy which equals 1 when a city is municipalities, 
provincial capitals , cities specifically designated in the 
state plan and special economic zones, 0 otherwise 
China City Statistical Yearbook (2004) 34 
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